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THEORETICAL (DIS-) POSITION AND STRATEGIC LEITMOTIVS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
L Du Plessis 
1  Introductory observations 
The constitutional makeover of a dilapidated South African state called for inimitable 
political prudence and integrity, and for courageous, ethical statesmanship rising 
above chancy brinkmanship. This essay zooms in on aspects of the historic 
restoration that bequeathed this country and its people a prototypical, justiciable 
Constitution. It is trite that a Constitution stands for the advancement of "the good" 
and the suppression of "evil". This clichéd truism bears regular reiteration as a 
reality check, to remind us of how easily benevolent governance can lose its footing 
on the slippery slopes of thuggish misgovernance and maladministration. 
The commitment to substantial constitutionalism saw South Africa efflorescing as a 
champion for constitutional democracy. The Jacob Zuma regime has, however, in 
the meantime generously and audaciously contributed to blemishing South Africa's 
favourable but still vulnerable reputation. Setbacks notwithstanding, the authority of 
the Constitution and the integrity of constitutionalism have survived so far, while the 
incursive endeavours of legislatures and the executive more often than not 
miscarried, owing to bold judicial intercession (when appropriate) and a vigilant civil 
society. 
The advent of constitutional democracy in South Africa has brought about a 
revolution in the field of the interpretation of enacted law, that is, law made by 
demonstrable, constitutionally authorised legislatures whose distinctive province is 
(or at least significantly includes) lawmaking.1 "Enacted law" consists of the 
supreme Constitution2 and all original (or primary) and delegated (or secondary) 
legislation in all spheres of government. The consequences of the interpretive 
                                            
  Lourens du Plessis. Hons BA (Stellenbosch), B Jur et Comm, LLB, B Phil, LLD (PU vir CHO). 
Extraordinary Professor of Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom). E-mail: 
lourens.duplessis@nwu.ac.za. 
1 Organs of state whose distinctive province significantly includes lawmaking will be organs of the 
executive who are competent delegated lawmakers. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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revolution have been vast and very visible. Statutory interpretation in South Africa 
had been deficient long before the advent of constitutional democracy, but the 
challenge of construing a supreme Constitution, an enacted law-text beyond 
compare in so many respects, brought matters to a head and set off what is also 
referred to as a linguistic, interpretive or hermeneutical turn. 
Hitherto mostly unnamed or unlabelled (but not entirely alien) interpretive strategies 
pursued and developed by users of the Constitution are up for discussion in the 
present article, with mainly the Constitutional Court under the loupe. Judges are 
eminent, authoritative and decidedly visible readers and expositors of the 
Constitution, but are not its only officially authorised exegetists. However, in the 
absence of a jurisprudence of interpretation attributable to judicial effort and 
leadership the interpretive turn would have been destined to come to naught and 
constitutional democracy to go awry. 
The traditional, common-law theories of statutory interpretation – also manifested in 
and as canons of construction – emanated from and thrived on certain dominant 
beliefs about the interpretation of law in general and enacted law in particular. 
These beliefs have been challenged by judges who acknowledged more and more 
that anyone's interpretation of the law, including their own, draws on a pre-
understanding (Vorverständnis) teeming with inarticulate premises. Presuppositions 
and prejudices are mental agents embedded in this Vorverständnis, engendered by, 
among other things, someone's life and worldview, which in its turn co-constitutes 
the human being in a world of cognition and experience which (s)he calls "reality". 
Negotiating reality compels choice, and choosing prompts positioning in and vis-à-vis 
reality. In scholarship and in learned professions significantly dependent on 
theoretical knowledge, the consolidated outcome of crucial choices instantiates 
someone's theoretical position or his/her philosophy. 
Interpretive leitmotivs bear witness to the presence - the effectual being there - of a 
theoretical position. Leitmotivs recur as keynote or defining ideas, motifs or topoi 
lending direction to specific instances of construing law. Four leitmotivs, each 
pertinent to a certain constellation of events in constitutional interpretation, are 
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discussed and their applicability and utility assessed, drawing on examples from 
constitutional case-law. The leitmotivs are: (i) transitional constitutionalism; (ii) 
transformative constitutionalism; (iii) monumental constitutionalism, and (iv) 
memorial constitutionalism. (i) and (ii) belong together as (A) programmatic 
leitmotivs and (iii) and (iv) as (B) commemorative leitmotivs. (A) is the pervasive 
reminder that the achievement of a negotiated transition embodied in a 
constitutional accord depends decisively on both well thought out strategic moves 
and due process, with (i) also functioning as a constitutionalism of justification. (A) 
furthermore measures the impact or "degree" of transition in a society on a socio-
political and constitutional Richter Scale, and warns of either complacent in- or hectic 
over-action when reaping the benefits of constitutional democracy. (B) endeavours 
to make sense of the present in relation to the past, and vice versa, taking the pulse 
of hope for the future. It is, in other words, the leitmotiv of (the Constitution as) 
memory and promise. 
Note below the schematic rendition of what is discussed in the text. The sequence in 
which arguments unfold in the discourse below is essentially but not entirely the 
same as in the scheme. 
        SCHEMATIC RENDITION – INTERPRETIVE LEITMOTIVS 
(A) PROGRAMMATIC LEITMOTIVS ↔  (B) COMMEMORATIVE LEITMOTIVS 
                                                                               
(I)   TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM          (III) MONUMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(II)  TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM   (IV) MEMORIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
2  Common-law theories of interpretation 
Juristic use of the term "theory" is notoriously loose. Sometimes it is a synonym for 
"rule" or "precept", for example, the "expedition theory" in the law of contract.3 A 
theory is, in part, "explanatory".4 The consensus theory in the law of contract, for 
instance, explains that a contract stems from a concursus animorum of the parties 
                                            
3 Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law 704-705. 
4 Pearsall New Oxford Dictionary 1922. Scholarly or scientific theories are examples of such 
explanatory models. 
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involved.5 A theory, as an idea accounting for a situation or substantiating a course 
of action, is justificatory as well, advancing the principles on which the practice of an 
activity is based.6 The consensus theory in the law of contract, for instance, justifies 
a finding that in the absence of a concursus animorum, a contract has not been 
concluded. The conventional theories of statutory interpretation, sometimes also 
referred to as "interpretative approaches", are both explanatory and justificatory in 
this way.7 The most prominent, traditional common-law theories of statutory 
interpretation are: 
(i) Literalism: maintaining that the meaning of an enacted provision can and 
must be deduced primarily from the language in which it is couched,8 thereby 
placing clear language on the same footing as plain or ordinary language;9 in other 
words, language as a native speaker would use and understand it;10 
(ii) Intentionalism: claiming that to discern and give effect to the intention of 
the legislature is the paramount rule of statutory interpretation;11 
(iii) Literalism-cum-intentionalism: traditionally the dominant theory of statutory 
interpretation in South Africa,12 premised on a combination of literalist and 
intentionalist assumptions; 
(iv) Contextualism: asserting that meaning is vitally dependent on context: only 
by reading an enacted provision and its words and language in context can its 
meaning(s) be determined;13 
(v) Purposivism: looking at a particular legislative provision as part of a more 
                                            
5 Du Bois Wille's Principles 736-737. 
6 Pearsall New Oxford Dictionary 1922. 
7 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 482. 
8 For examples, see Steyn et al Uitleg van Wette 64-67. 
9 Maxwell and Langan Interpretation of Statutes 28-29. 
10 Cross, Bell and Engle Statutory Interpretation 1. 
11   Steyn et al Uitleg van Wette 2. 
12 For a classical verbalisation of this theory, see Venter v R 1907 TS 910 913 per Innes J. For 
recent examples of one of South Africa's two highest courts (the Supreme Court of Appeal) still 
adhering to it, see Randburg Town Council v Kerksay Investments (Pty) Ltd 1998 1 SA 98 (SCA) 
107A-B; Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 1 SA 925 (A) 
942I-J; Manyasha v Minister of Law and Order 1999 2 SA 179 (SCA) 185B-C; Commissioner, SA 
Revenue Service v Executor, Frith's Estate 2001 2 SA 261 (SCA) 273G-I. 
13 West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 1925 AD 245 261; Jaga v Dönges; 
Bhana v Dönges 1950 4 SA 653 (A) 664H; Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey 1980 1 SA 472 
(A) 478A-B, S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 10; Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powell 
1996 1 SA 984 (CC) paras 52, 54, 57, 70 per Ackermann J and para 170 per Chaskalson P; S v 
Motshari 2001 2 All SA 207 (NC) para 8. 
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encompassing instrument, and contending that meaning is to be attributed to such a 
provision in the light of the purpose(s) or object(s) it has been designed to 
achieve;14 and 
(vi) Objectivism: which is meant as an antidote to the subjectivism of 
intentionalism; it maintains that once a law has been enacted the legislature has had 
its say and the text assumes an existence of its own15 and must then be concretised 
and brought to completion, in an actual situation, by a court acting as the 
legislature's delegate. 
None of these theories by itself can, however, adequately explain what 
interpretation – let alone constitutionally induced shifts in modes of and approaches 
to interpretation – really entails. 
3 Theoretical multi-functionality 
Frank Michelman16 identifies literalism, intentionalism, purposivism instrumentalism 
and moralism as theories of constitutional interpretation in the USA context. These 
theories derive from approaches to interpretation akin to our own common-law 
theories of statutory interpretation. Michelman says of these theories that they 
constitute a "kind of standard list of interpretative approaches or methods available 
to constitution adjudicators – from which, it's sometimes imagined, a judge chooses 
one (or perhaps just falls into one)".17 He is adamant that the items on the said list 
... cannot be alternatives among which a judge chooses; they are multiple poles in 
a complex field of forces, among which judges navigate and negotiate. I don't 
believe that any responsible constitutional adjudicator will end up, over any 
interesting run of cases ignoring any of the factors: perceived verbal significations, 
perceived concrete intentions, perceived general purposes, perceived and evaluated 
                                            
14 See eg Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd v Distillers Corp (SA) Ltd 1962 1 SA 458 (A) 473F; 
Nasionale Vervoerkommissie van Suid-Afrika v Salz Gossow Transport 1983 4 SA 344 (A) 357A; 
Kanhym Bpk v Oudtshoorn Munisipaliteit 1990 3 SA 252 (C) 261C-D; Raats Röntgen and 
Vermeulen (Pty) Ltd v Administrator Cape 1991 1 SA 827 (C) 837A; Stopforth v Minister of 
Justice; Veenendaal v Minister of Justice 2000 1 SA 113 (SCA) para 21. 
15 For a discussion of this approach, see Cowen 1976 TSAR 156-158; Devenish Interpretation of 
Statutes 50-51. 
16 In a talk on constitutional interpretation before a South African audience witnessing the 
beginning of their own tradition of constitutional interpretation. A transcript of this introductory 
talk/address during a seminar of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the 
Witwatersrand is available as Michelman 1995 SAJHR 477-485. The seminar took place from 23 
to 25 January 1995. 
17 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 482. 
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social consequences, perceived and intuited normative theories or unifying 
visions.18 
German constitutional interpretation affords a special place to five theories of 
fundamental rights (Grundrechtstheorien),19 namely the classical liberal theory, the 
institutional theory, the value theory, the democratic-functional theory and the 
welfare-state theory. Here too none of the theories enjoys pre-eminence in the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, and in the circumstances of 
particular cases the court chooses freely which theory to rely on. Theoretical multi-
functionality (Multifunktionalität), as Michael Sachs20 calls this free choosing, is in 
other words also a feature of German constitutional interpretation. 
4 Exit literalism and intentionalism, enter constitutionalism 
Constitutional supremacy as both "a constitutional fact"21 and a value22 has dealt the 
dominance of the literalist-cum-intentionalist theory of interpretation – in the areas 
of statutory and constitutional interpretation at least – a decided blow. Nowadays a 
statutory provision is first and most importantly to be understood not as the 
legislature supposedly intended it, but in conformity with the Constitution. The 
possible meaning of a statutory provision most compatible with the Constitution is, in 
other words, to be preferred: 
The interpretative notion of ascertaining "the intention of the Legislature" does not 
apply in a system of judicial review based on the supremacy of the Constitution, for 
the simple reason that the Constitution is sovereign and not the Legislature.23 
"All statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights",24 which 
means that section 39(2) of the Constitution actually establishes a new canon of 
statutory interpretation, namely that legislation must be construed to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This canon cannot be overridden by 
                                            
18 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 483. 
19 Böckenförde 1974 NJW. An English translation of this article occurs in Böckenförde State, Society 
and Liberty 175-203. See also Sachs Grundgesetz Kommentar 53-55 
20 Sachs Grundgesetz Kommentar 55. 
21 By virtue of s 2 of the Constitution. 
22 By virtue of s 1(c) of the Constitution. See also Michelman "Rule of Law" 11-34 – 11-36. 
23 Froneman J in Matiso v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 3 SA 592 (SE) 
597E. 
24 Investigating Directorate:  Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd. In re: 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21. 
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"legislative intent" couched in (allegedly) "clear and unambiguous language". The 
"intention of the legislature", in all its possible significations, will always be subject 
(and second) to the Constitution, and not only when a statute is (allegedly) 
inconsistent with a provision or provisions of the Constitution.25 The interpretive 
strategy helping to give specific effect to this (new) canon of statutory interpretation 
in section 39(2) is known as reading in conformity with the Constitution 
(Verfassungskonforme Auslegung). 
5 The notion of a "theoretical position" in law 
A theory is explanatory and justificatory at the same time. A legal interpreter's 
theory of interpretation causes him or her to relate, intentionally or intuitively, issues 
of interpretation to broader questions regarding, amongst others, the role and 
function of language in law and the possibility of justice through the reading and 
realisation of written law. It also situates interpretive endeavours in a legal and 
constitutional tradition within prevailing understandings of matters of interpretive 
consequence, such as the nature and the division of power (reflected in, for 
example, trias politica) and the role appropriate to authorised (judicial and other) 
interpreters of the law in the system. An approach to interpretation is premised on 
and shaped by theoretical assumptions about the crucial matters just mentioned and 
by numerous other matters too. In constitutional interpretation these matters may, 
for instance, manifest in what Michelman calls "an emergent national sense of 
justice to which ... interpretations ... recursively" contribute.26 
When the notion "theory of constitutional interpretation" is thought of as a position 
based on assumptions about the crucial matters mentioned above, it becomes clear 
why one-word depictions and one-sentence definitions – all parading as "theories" of 
                                            
25 The court in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd. In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21 motivated the 
overriding significance of the canon of statutory interpretation derived from s 39(2) as follows: 
 "All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. The 
Constitution is located in a history which involves a transition from a society based on division, 
injustice and exclusion from the democratic process to one which respects the dignity of all 
citizens and includes all in the process of governance.  As such, the process of interpreting the 
Constitution must recognize the context in which we find ourselves and the Constitution's goal of 
a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.  This spirit of 
transition and transformation characterizes the constitutional enterprise as a whole." 
26 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 485. 
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or "approaches" to constitutional interpretation – are by themselves inadequate 
explanations of and justifications for "constitutional interpretation" in its complexity. 
Literalism, intentionalism and contextualism, for instance, cannot be theories of 
constitutional (or statutory) interpretation, but are at most elements of theoretical 
positions. 
A theoretical position, pertinent to constitutional interpretation, is determined by the 
assumptions referred to above and it is a constitutional interpreter's theoretical 
position, rather than any specific conventional approach to (or common-law theory 
of) interpretation on which (s)he may rely that co-determines interpretive 
outcome.27 To make an assumption involves making a choice. Theoretical positions 
on constitutional interpretation coming from choices thus made therefore order and 
rank (or hierarchize) interpretive preferences.28 
A theoretical position, which is a theoretical disposition at the same time, is not in its 
entirety rationally or even consciously decided on. "Jurists in practice" (including 
judicial officers), especially, do not habitually devote time to reflect specifically on 
(and explain or justify) their theoretical positions, which mostly become discernible 
in the arguments they rely on to justify specific interpretive outcomes.29 A theoretical 
position may nonetheless be reflected on, contested, defended, explained and (also 
consciously) changed. It may also be shared with others although, due to the 
uniqueness of each individual, no two theoretical positions can probably be identical 
in every detail. A theoretical position is constituted by multifarious interacting factors 
and forces, some of which result from conscious, reasoned choice, while others 
derive from intuitive perception. Covert and subconsciously held (theoretical) 
assumptions, precisely because of an interpreter's uncritical unawareness of them, 
often have a more decisive impact on interpretive outcome than overt and 
consciously reasoned assumptions.30 
A nation's judiciary cannot assume a theoretical position en bloc on issues of 
                                            
27 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 484-485. 
28 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 484-485. 
29 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 483-485 gives examples of this. 
30 Fish Doing What Comes Naturally 358. 
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constitutional (or statutory) interpretation. The theoretical position of an individual 
judge may, as a matter of fact, vary from case to case depending on the measure of 
latitude that the law and the canons of construction allow for deciding the specific 
issues in a case.31 However, it is possible that, within a given jurisdiction or tradition, 
a theoretical position of a certain kind may dominate how interpreters of a 
constitution (and of statutes and other law too), especially the judges and legal 
practitioners, approach their task. An overriding theoretical position may in time 
even become a template for additional (or auxiliary) positions on and approaches to 
interpretation.32 Literalism-cum-intentionalism has long held a dominant position in 
statutory interpretation in South Africa,33 with contextualism and purposivism mostly 
in auxiliary or secondary roles. The belief, growing in popularity, that since the 
advent of constitutional democracy in South Africa purposivism has been replacing 
literalism-cum-intentionalism as the template approach – definitely in constitutional 
interpretation, but increasingly so in statutory interpretation too – is not 
unproblematic.34 It is a misapprehension that reliance on a single preferred approach 
to (constitutional or statutory) interpretation can eventually "make all the 
difference". Since 1994 it has mainly been "an emergent [new] national sense of 
justice" (à la Michelman)35 – and not any particular interpretive approach – that has 
navigated constitutional and statutory interpretation in South Africa along previously 
unexplored pathways. 
6 Interpretive leitmotivs and the law: some illustrations 
The complexity of a theoretical position precludes a full and reliable depiction of it at 
first glance, and is most often recognised quite piecemeal, as it were, by effects or 
consequences in which it manifests (aspects of) itself, and not as a holistic picture of 
some sort. Theoretical positions, or aspects of them, can and do, for instance, 
become visible in interpretive leitmotivs detectable as recurring keynote or defining 
                                            
31 See eg Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 1 SA 925 (A) 943C-
944A. 
32 In Du Plessis 2005 SALJ 591-613 the present author, for instance, showed how such a template 
position in South Africa occasioned the development of a hierarchical order of primacy involving 
the canons of and aids to statutory interpretation. 
33 Du Plessis "Interpretation" 32-32 – 32-33. 
34 Du Plessis "Interpretation" 32-52 – 32-56. 
35 Michelman 1995 SAJHR 485. Also see Du Plessis "Interpretation" 32-52 – 32-56. 
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ideas, motifs or topoi guiding instances of constitutional interpretation. The same 
leitmotiv can manifest (aspects of) different theoretical positions on constitutional 
interpretation, but it is hardly conceivable that contradictory or conflicting theoretical 
positions will manifest in a significant number of similar or corresponding leitmotivs. 
The conventional approaches to – or theories of – statutory interpretation, such as 
literalism-cum-intentionalism or purposivism, cannot really be leitmotivs because 
they do not (re-)present and are not the sources of any ideas of significance from 
within themselves. 
The judgment of the Constitutional Court in MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v 
Pillay36 helpfully illustrates what leitmotivs are – and how one of the eminent 
leitmotivs in South African constitutional interpretation can enhance and enrich an 
interpretive event. 
Sunali Pillay, a teenage Hindu girl, enjoyed an excellent school education at the 
Durban Girls' High School. In breach of a stipulation in her school's Code of Conduct 
Sunali, upon reaching physical maturity, had her nose pierced and a gold stud 
inserted not for fashion purposes, but to honour a long-standing family tradition, as 
a religious ritual and for cultural reasons. The school management refused to grant 
Sunali an exemption to wear the nose stud and this kick-started a series of litigation 
ending up in the Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court dismissed a number of arguments on behalf of the school, 
but of significance for the present purposes was the Court's response to the school's 
argument that wearing a nose stud was not a mandatory tenet of either Sunali's 
religion or her culture, and that the refusal of the exemption she sought would 
therefore not force her to do something against her religion or culture. The Court 
per Langa CJ disagreed: 
Freedom is one of the underlying values of our Bill of Rights and courts must 
interpret all rights to promote the underlying values of "human dignity, equality and 
freedom". These values are not mutually exclusive but enhance and reinforce each 
other ... The protection of voluntary as well as obligatory practices also conforms to 
the Constitution's commitment to affirming diversity. It is a commitment that is 
totally in accord with this nation's decisive break from its history of intolerance and 
                                            
36 MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
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exclusion. Differentiating between mandatory and voluntary practices does not 
celebrate or affirm diversity, it simply permits it. That falls short of our constitutional 
project which not only affirms diversity, but promotes and celebrates it. We cannot 
celebrate diversity by permitting it only when no other option remains.37 
Listen! Do you hear it? The "never again" – "nie wieder"? The clarion call of 
memorial (or Mahnmal) constitutionalism which, together with monumental, 
transitional and transformative constitutionalism, has guided especially the 
Constitutional Court's interpretive thinking decidedly enough to have earned the 
appellation (and reputation) of leitmotivs in constitutional interpretation in South 
Africa. Observations about transitional and transformative constitutionalism will 
follow in due course, but first more about memorial and monumental 
constitutionalism. 
7  Memorial and monumental constitutionalism 
A constitution both narrates and authors a nation's history – so memorial 
constitutionalism maintains. Two constitutions since 1994 have accordingly archived 
as well as effected far-reaching change in South Africa. A constitution memorialises 
the past, but is also a monument triumphantly shedding the shackles of what went 
before, and setting a nation free to take thought (and responsibility) for its future. 
Memorial constitutionalism is a constitutionalism of memory in a South Africa (still) 
coming to terms with its notorious past, but eventually also a constitutionalism of 
promise along the way of (still) getting to grips with the future. 
Memorial constitutionalism, as interpretive leitmotiv, calls attention to and affirms 
the power of the unspectacular, non-monumental Constitution as vital (co-
)determinant of constitutional democracy. The memorial Constitution coexists with 
the monumental Constitution,38 kindling the hope that duly and simultaneously 
acknowledged, the coexistence of the Constitution's monumental and memorial 
modes of being – which, at a glance, may seem to be at odds – will be mutually 
inclusive, constructive and invigorating. 
                                            
37 MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) paras 63-64, 65. 
38 The image of the Constitution as monument and memorial emerged from legal scholars' 
engagement with the work of the South African philosopher, Johan Snyman, on the politics of 
memory. See Snyman 1998 Acta Juridica 317-321. 
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Monuments and memorials have memory in common, but in distinct ways: a 
monument celebrates; a memorial commemorates. The difference in (potential) 
meaning(s) between the two may be subtle, and some dictionaries may even 
indicate that "celebrate" and "commemorate" are synonyms, but according to 
memorial constitutionalists they are not really or, at least, not exactly synonymous. 
Heroes and achievements can be celebrated or lionised. The same does not apply to 
anti-heroes, failures and blunders: they must be remembered, yes, but they can 
hardly be celebrated. "Commemorate" is a feasible synonym for "remember", while 
"celebrate" is an exultant or jubilant mode of remembering. The closeness in 
meaning of "celebrate" and "commemorate" is not lamentable, however. On the 
contrary, it suggests their coexistence - contradictions notwithstanding. The German 
Denkmal and Mahnmal neatly capture the said contradictions. A Denkmal can 
celebrate (and may even commemorate), but a Mahnmal inevitably warns (and may 
even castigate). Monuments and memorials are aesthetic creations, and memorial 
constitutionalism contends that a constitution may, with interpretive consequences, 
be thought of as such a creation too.39 
Restrained Mahnmal constitutionalism has resounded, in post-apartheid South Africa, 
the "Nie wieder!" that also inspired constitutionalism in a post-Holocaust Germany.40 
On the strength of this Mahnmal constitutionalism, human dignity as a value has, for 
instance, gained an upper hand in our constitutional project in general, and in our 
constitutional jurisprudence. This is true of our equality jurisprudence in particular. 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay41 must be understood in this context. In a 
sense Pillay is (to use a Dworkinian metaphor)42 a chapter in a constitutional chain 
novel rigorously interrogating issues of identity and difference. A resoluteness not to 
repeat the injustices of the past has resulted in the affirmation of the status and 
dignity of several vulnerable groups and categories of persons who, under a culture 
of authority, had been marginalised and stigmatised for their non-compliance with 
"mainstream" morality and its preconceptions about how societal life is best 
                                            
39 Le Roux 2005 TSAR 107. 
40 Du Plessis L "German Verfassungsrecht" 531. 
41 MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
42 Dworkin Law's Empire 228-238. 
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organised. Emblematic of the courts' (and especially the Constitutional Court's) 
affirmative endeavours are the confidence and forthrightness with which, 
unperturbed by the conventional public-private divide, they have addressed 
deficiencies in laws regulating intimate relationships. Landmark judgments that come 
to mind in this regard are National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of Justice43 (the criminalisation of sodomy was found to be unconstitutional); 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs44 (the 
court read words into a statutory provision to extend immigration benefits that 
"spouses" of South African nationals enjoyed to same sex life-partners); Satchwell v 
President of the Republic of South Africa45 (words were read into a statutory 
provision conferring financial benefits on a judge's "surviving spouse" so as to 
extend such benefits to a same sex life-partner); and Daniels v Campbell46 (a 
surviving "spouse" reaping benefits from legislative provision for maintenance was 
held to include a partner in a Muslim marriage).47 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; 
Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs,48 the Constitutional 
Court judgment in which the statutory and common-law exclusion of same-sex life 
partnerships from the ambit of "marriage" was held to be unconstitutional, 
constitutes a high-water mark in the evolution of the constitutional jurisprudence on 
issues of identity and difference drawing on the compelling strength of memorial 
constitutionalism. 
There are also some quite pedestrian cases in which memorial constitutionalism as a 
leitmotiv guided the Constitutional Court's reasoning decisively and had already done 
so since the early days of constitutional democracy.49 In Jafta v Schoeman; Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz,50 for instance, the Court was called upon to consider a challenge to 
                                            
43 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC). 
44 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 2000 2 SA 1 (CC). 
45 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC). 
46 Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC). 
47 For more examples, see Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 
198 (CC); J v Director-General Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC). 
48 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 
2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
49  See eg S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC) para 111; President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1996 1 SA 725 (CC) 
para 41; Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 121 (CC) para 27. 
50 Jafta v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
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the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Magistrates' Court Act51 which, in 
practice, had the effect that the houses of indigent judgment debtors – many of 
them first-time home owners who had acquired their homes with state subsidies – 
were attached and sold in execution to satisfy trifling debts. This, the applicants 
contended, was incompatible with the rights to adequate housing and security of 
(residential) tenure entrenched in sections 26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution. In 
considering the challenge, the Court per Mokgoro J made it clear that "[s]ecurity of 
tenure in our historical context" had to be a crucial part of the enquiry.52 The Court's 
reasoning in this case as well as the remedial relief it eventually granted to mitigate 
the effects of the impugned legislation bear the hallmark of memorial 
constitutionalism. 
8  Transitional constitutionalism: the one-way bridge of justification 
Transitional constitutionalism as the constitutionalism of justification depicts the 
Constitution as a bridge from the "old" South Africa to the "new", and thereby from 
a culture of authority to a culture of justification.53 
South Africa's 1993 (transitional) Constitution54 concluded with an unusual 
Postamble (or Postscript), an exhibition of efflorescent language, entitled National 
Unity and Reconciliation and decreed55 to form part of the substance of the 
Constitution. The Postamble anticipated that the Constitution would provide "a 
historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, 
conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of 
human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities 
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex". It furthermore 
verbalised a quest for "the pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South 
African citizens and peace", requiring "reconciliation between the people of South 
Africa and the reconstruction of society". 
                                            
51 Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
52 Jafta v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) paras 25-34. 
53 Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 31-32. 
54 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
55 By virtue of s 232(4) of the said transitional Constitution. 
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The Postamble found its way into the transitional Constitution as an attempt to 
break a deadlock in the constitutional negotiations resulting from the constitution-
makers' inability to agree, in precise terms and in time for the adoption of the 
transitional Constitution, on how to deal with "gross violations of human rights, the 
transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, 
fear, guilt and revenge" from the past.56 The Postamble thus envisaged, in broad 
terms, the eventual adoption of cut-off dates and "mechanisms, criteria and 
procedures" for amnesty "in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with 
political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past". The 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act57 was subsequently enacted, 
stipulating conditions – and laying down procedures to apply – for such amnesty. 
Much of the spirit and tenor of the Postamble survived in the Preamble to the 1996 
Constitution – with implications for the latter as a possible textual source-in-writing 
of transitional constitutionalism as interpretive leitmotiv. 
 "What is the point of our Bill of Rights?" Etienne Mureinik asked in one of the 
earliest commentaries on South Africa's first (or transitional) Bill of Rights,58 and 
then set out to answer this question, exploring the bridge metaphor in the 
Postamble to the transitional Constitution:59 
If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what 
it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which 
every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by 
government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions, not 
the fear inspired by the force at its command. The new order must be a community 
built on persuasion, not coercion. 
Justification and transition-as-a-bridge are not intrinsically related, but combining 
them presented an unusually powerful image of the "culture of justification" that 
many – like Mureinik – believed to be the quintessence of the new constitutional 
dispensation in South Africa. To this day Mureinik's articulation of (especially) what 
"the new Constitution" clearly "must be a bridge to" has been cited with approval 
                                            
56 For more on the nature of the compromise the parties reached, see Dyzenhaus Truth, 
Reconciliation 1-6. 
57 Promotional of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
58 Ch 3 of the transitional Constitution. 
59 Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 31-32. 
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and appreciation by many South African courts and by the Constitutional Court in 
particular,60 and has thereby indeed established itself as an interpretive leitmotiv of 
consequence, more aptly depicted as justificatory rather than transitional 
constitutionalism. The constitutionalism of justification is a more elegant alternative 
for justificatory constitutionalism. 
Much within the precincts of "the culture of justification" in administrative law is, at 
any rate, under the regulative authority of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act,61 a statute required by section 33(3) of the Constitution and enacted to give 
specific effect to the fundamental right to just administrative action entrenched in 
the Bill of Rights.62 Some Constitutional Court judgments have, however, also 
contributed substantially to establish a culture of justification as a benchmark for 
administrative action. 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA. In re: The Ex Parte Application 
of the President of the RSA63 the Constitutional Court, for instance, proclaimed the 
essential unity of the Constitution and (administrative) common law in dealing with 
the exercise of public power,64 rejecting a suggestion – of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Rennie Group Ltd trading as Renfreight65 – 
that any common law from an era predating the inception of a constitutional culture 
of justification has continued to survive undisturbed. The judgments in Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism66 and Minister of 
Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd,67 duly accounting for the effects of the 
                                            
60 Here are but a few examples: Qozoleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 3 SA 625 (E) 634E-F; 
Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) para 25; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of SA. In re: The Ex Parte Application of the President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 
(CC) para 85 n 107; Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 
BCLR 47 (CC) para 100. 
61 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
62 In s 33(1) of the Constitution. 
63 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA. In re: The Ex Parte Application of the President 
of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 (CC). 
64 The judgement predates the commencement of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. 
65 Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner for Customs 
and Excise v Rennies Group Ltd t/a Renfreight 1999 3 SA 771 (SCA). 
66 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
67 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC). 
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Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, have also contributed significantly to the 
culture of justification in administrative law. 
A constitutionalism of justification is most certainly not only of consequence in 
relation to administrative justice, and the Constitutional Court's judgment in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance,68 (the FNB 
case) developing a set of guidelines for determining when a deprivation of property 
is arbitrary and hence unjustified, is therefore also a crucial contribution to the kind 
of jurisprudence Mureinik must have anticipated when he spelt out his 
understanding of crossing the bridge of transition in South Africa. Adjudicative 
determination of the issue of arbitrariness was overdue and necessary for the peace 
of mind of propertied beneficiaries under section 25 of the Constitution (the property 
clause) and to promote legal certainty. The advantages of this landmark judgment 
have, however, been eroded to some extent by what could be construed as the 
Constitutional Court's subsequent retreat from its FNB69 position in, for instance, the 
case of Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo 
City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign MEC for Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng.70 The flexible and context-sensitive manner in which the FNB71 
guidelines, as conceptual distinctions, were converted into a multi-factor balancing 
test,72 probably paved the way for deviation from them in Mkontwana.73 
If the FNB case74 has had the potential to conduce property owners' peace of mind, 
then the Constitutional Court judgment in Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld 
                                            
68 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
69 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
70 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 
530 (CC). For a critical discussion of this case, see Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 75-89. 
71 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
72 Roux 2009 ICON 106-138. 
73 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 
530 (CC). 
74 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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Community,75 and the preceding judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the 
same case76 certainly have the potential to kindle the property aspirations of 
prospective beneficiaries of section 25, and especially communities and individuals 
whose property was taken away from them under a colonial and apartheid culture of 
authority.77 The Richtersveld judgments have gone a long way towards bringing the 
common law on indigenous title within the ambit of a constitutionalism of 
justification – just as the FNB case78 had done with the Roman-Dutch based 
common law of property. 
A high threshold of justification applies when legislative and administrative action, 
likely to compromise the rudiments of constitutional democracy, is up for 
constitutional review. In the course of such a review South Africa's two highest 
courts have emerged as staunch guardians of, for instance, participatory democracy 
in law-making. Both the Supreme Court of Appeal, in King v Attorneys Fidelity Fund 
Board of Control,79 and the Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life v Speaker of the 
National Assembly80 as well as Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of 
South Africa,81 required the National Assembly's meticulous compliance with its 
constitutional obligations82 to facilitate public involvement in its legislative and other 
processes, and in its committees, and to conduct its business in an open manner. 
The absence of meticulous compliance with these obligations, it was held, renders 
legislative action and legislation ensuing from such action null and void.83 The case 
of African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral Commission84 was also an 
instance of guarding the rudiments of popular democracy not by strictly enforcing 
                                            
75 Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC). 
76 Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 BCLR 583 (SCA); but not so much the judgement 
in the Land Claims Court as the court of first instance – Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd  
2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC). 
77 Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 32. 
78 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
79 King v Attorneys' Fidelity Fund Board of Control 2006 1 SA 474 (SCA). 
80 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC). 
81 Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 BCLR 47 (CC). 
82 In s 59(1) of the Constitution. 
83 The Supreme Court of Appeal in King v Attorneys' Fidelity Fund Board of Control 2006 1 SA 474 
(SCA) could of course not make a declaration of invalidity because adjudication of the National 
Assembly's fulfilment of this obligation is, in terms of s 167(4)(e) of the Constitution, within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
84 African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral Commission 2006 3 SA 305 (CC). 
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procedural requirements, but by relaxing them (through purposive interpretation) in 
order to "promote enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement and participation 
[in] rather than exclusion from municipal elections".85 
The South African Constitutional Court has also earned itself a complimentary 
reputation for its "... 'universalist interpretation' of constitutional rights, in a series of 
judgments relating mostly to criminal processes",86 beginning with judgements such 
as S v Makwanyane87 and S v Zuma.88 Vigilance in guarding the due process of the 
law in criminal proceedings is very much a distinctive attribute of a constitutionalism 
of justification. 
9  Transformative constitutionalism: the bridge bridging 
Transformative constitutionalism, in the words of Karl Klare,89 
... connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent 
political processes grounded in law ... a transformation vast enough to be 
inadequately captured by the phrase "reform," but something short of or different 
from "revolution" in any traditional sense of the word. In the background is the idea 
of a highly egalitarian, caring, multicultural community, governed through 
participatory, democratic processes in both the polity and large portions of what we 
now call the "private sphere". 
Klare wrote these words in an article on transformative constitutionalism in which he 
paid tribute to Etienne Mureinik, the principal proponent of a constitutionalism of 
justification. 
Some critical legal scholars have questioned justificatory constitutionalism's use of 
the bridge metaphor to depict transition as a once-off, linear progression from "the 
old dispensation" to "the new", and thus from a culture of authority to a culture of 
justification. André van der Walt, for instance, claims that 
... the bridge metaphor ... allows for another interpretation where the bridge is not 
simply an instrument for getting out of one place and into another, but an edifice 
that is inherently related to the abyss which it spans. Here, the focus is not on the 
two spaces on either side of the abyss, but on the abyss itself – the bridge is 
                                            
85 African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral Commission 2006 3 SA 305 (CC) para 23. 
86 Peters "Globalization of State Constitutions" 300-301. 
87 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
88 S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC). 
89 Klare 1998 SAJHR 150. 
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functionally and inherently linked to and obtains its significance from the abyss 
beneath it, so that the bridge is not a temporary instrument for a single crossing, 
one way, but allows and invites multiple crossings, in both directions, since there is 
no inherent value attached to being one side of the bridge rather than the other. In 
this alternative interpretation of the bridge metaphor the danger is to stay on one 
side, while the bridge allows us to connect one side with the other.90 
Wessel le Roux adds that it is not the bridge itself which is significant but the act of 
bridging, of linking the past and the future, reality and imagination, in order to 
create new ideas in the present.91 Memorial constitutionalism makes very much the 
same point: South Africa is still coming to terms with its notorious past along the 
way of still getting to grips with the future. The past cannot and should not be left 
behind – there is in other words no once-off crossing of the bridge – and the 
promise of the future gains much of its significance from engagement with the 
past.92 
Michael Bishop calls the bridge that Van der Walt and Le Roux metaphorically 
envision "a transformative bridge" and explains its significance as follows: 
[V]an der Walt and le Roux offer a space in which dialogue and transformation are 
truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly created, accepted and 
rejected and in which change is unpredictable and constant. I would call this a 
transformative bridge because it envisions constant change and re-evaluation 
without end, rather than a move from one point to another ... [T]he transitional 
bridge is a path, while the transformative bridge is a space.93 
What emerges from the discussion so far is that transformative constitutionalism has 
every potential to impact constitutional (and, more generally, legal) interpretation 
profoundly and guide, as a leitmotiv, both the interpretive mind-set (also read: 
theoretical position(s)) and the interpretive style (also read: methodology) of 
especially judicial interpreters of the Constitution, in an irrevocably new direction.94 
South Africa's Constitution is furthermore thoroughly transformative in many 
respects, and in section 7(2) it invites (and arguably compels) the optimum 
realisation of the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, requiring the state not only 
                                            
90 Van der Walt 2001 SALJ 295-296. 
91 Le Roux 2004 SA Public Law 634. 
92 Van der Walt 2001 SALJ 296. 
93 Bishop "Transforming Memory" 37. 
94 On the impact of transformative constitutionalism on constitutional interpretation and 
adjudication, see Klare 1998 SAJHR 146-188; Pieterse 2005 SA Public Law 155-166; Langa 2006 
Stell LR 351-360. 
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to respect and protect, but (also) to promote and fulfil those rights. 
Klare typifies the South African Constitution as "post-liberal" because it 
simultaneously entrenches conventional liberal democracy and the basic tenets of 
(and normative preconditions to) an all-out transformation of South African society.95 
The distinctive traits of the transformative South African Constitution are said to be 
(among others) "the attainment of substantive equality, the realisation of social 
justice, the infusion of the private sphere with human rights standards and the 
cultivation of a culture of justification in public law interactions".96 Pius Langa, South 
Africa's former Chief Justice, in an extra-curial writing, conceives of such traits as 
challenges posed by the transformative Constitution, namely to procure equal access 
to justice for all, to educate law students who will be up to the demands of the kind 
of legal and social order envisaged in the Constitution, to rid the legal culture of its 
formalism, and to create a climate for and, indeed, conduce national reconciliation.97 
The transformative nature of the Constitution has far-reaching implications for its 
interpretation and necessitates a decisive makeover of legal culture, especially as it 
manifests in the conventional manners (and assumptions) of adjudicative reasoning 
pertinent to the interpretation and implementation of enacted law. Klare writes in 
this regard:98 
The Constitution invites a new imagination and self-reflection about legal method, 
analysis and reasoning consistent with its transformative goals. By implication, new 
conceptions of judicial role and responsibility are contemplated. Judicial mind-set 
and methodology are part of the law, and therefore they must be examined and 
revised so as to promote equality, a culture of democracy and transparent 
governance. 
According to Klare the drafters of the Constitution, having dramatically reworked 
substantive constitutional foundations and assumptions, could not have intended the 
new Constitution to be interpreted with reliance on conventional legalist methods of 
interpretation, thereby having its transformative qualities restrained by "the 
intellectual instincts and habits of mind of the traditional common or Roman-Dutch 
                                            
95 Klare 1998 SAJHR 153; also see Pieterse 2005 SA Public Law 163-164. 
96 Pieterse 2005 SA Public Law 161. Also see Langa 2006 Stell LR 353-354. 
97 Langa 2006 Stell LR 354-359. 
98 Klare 1998 SAJHR 156. 
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lawyer trained and professionally socialized during the apartheid era".99 
Transformative constitutionalism thus inspires preference for non-formalist, non-
legalist and non-literalist approaches to constitutional interpretation and, very 
importantly, it explodes the myth that an a- or non-political legal interpretation – 
and constitutional interpretation, in particular – is achievable. 
South African courts (and the Constitutional Court in particular) have on several 
occasions in the course of construing the Constitution, made boldly transformative 
moves. Most of the judgements where this happened could well be depicted as 
instances of transformative constitutionalism, though in much of its jurisprudence on 
intimate relationships – which is outcome-wise very progressive – the Constitutional 
Court tended to rely on a rather conventional formalist, legalist and literalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, thereby dashing Klare's hopes that 
transformative constitutionalism would go hand in hand with an innovative mode of 
constitutional interpretation shedding conventional -isms.100 
The Constitutional Court judgements most directly and evidently inspired by 
transformative constitutionalism as an interpretive leitmotiv are probably those 
dealing with the state's obligation to implement socioeconomic rights. Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom101 heralded a wholehearted (judicial) 
acceptance of the justiciability of the socioeconomic entitlements enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights (in sections 26 and 27 in particular). It furthermore emphasised 
competent courts' responsibility to enforce these entitlements by carefully crafting 
appropriate "orders with teeth" to redress government authorities' disinclination 
and/or incapacity to procure access to the commodities to which the said 
entitlements pertain. The Grootboom judgment blazed the trail for the bold and far-
reaching declaratory and mandatory orders in Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign,102 compelling the fulfilment of the state's constitutional mandate (and 
obligation) to supply and administer Nevirapine to HIV-positive women and their 
                                            
99 Klare 1998 SAJHR 156. 
100 Klare 1998 SAJHR 156. 
101 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
102 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 




Generally speaking, it is transformative constitutionalism that pilots and shapes 
meaningful implementation of the socioeconomic rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights. According to Sandra Liebenberg104 South Africa's transformative Constitution, 
with its decided emphasis on socioeconomic rights, "aims to facilitate the 
transformation of society by setting right the wrongs of the past", but also "aims at 
facilitating the construction of a new political, social and economic order 'based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights'".105 The 
Constitution is, in other words, both backward-looking and forward-looking – an 
insight that also resonates favourably with memorial constitutionalism. 
10  Intermezzo 
So far only tentative conclusions can follow from a still incomplete catalogue of 
leitmotivs in action, gleaned from actual instances of constitutional adjudication. 
Working with the samples selected it has become clear that an incontrovertible 
classification of judgments with reference to dominant leitmotivs determining their 
outcome is not achievable. The impetus of memorial constitutionalism, for instance, 
decisively codetermined the outcome of Constitutional Court cases in which rights to 
criminal due process in accordance with the exigencies of a constitutionalism of 
justification were meticulously upheld. It also appeared that a progressive and 
activist – backward- and forward-looking – adjudication of socio-economic rights 
issues can draw momentum both from transformative and memorial 
constitutionalism. 
How then do leitmotivs help us to do "better" constitutional interpretation? To begin 
with, they show up rights interpretation and application as more than just an 
intellectual or "logical" process of deduction and subsumption. It is also an engaging 
performance of aesthetic significance, into the spirit of which an interpreter can 
enter. Most dictionaries give, as the primary meaning of "leitmotiv", something like 
                                            
103 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
104 Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights 25. 
105 See the preamble to the Constitution; Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights 27. 
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"[a] theme associated throughout a [musical] work with a particular person, 
situation, or sentiment".106 This phenomenon is especially associated with the opera 
music of Richard Wagner. Some dictionaries will concede that a leitmotiv can also be 
"[a] recurrent idea or image in a literary work etc.".107 The entry "leitmotiv" is absent 
from most dictionaries of philosophy, dictionaries of ideas and dictionaries of the 
humanities and social sciences. The Woordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal (WAT), on 
the other hand, generously explores quite a range of meanings of the word 
"leitmotiv"108 (also "leidmotief", "leimotief" and "leitmotief"109). 
It is significant that "leitmotiv" is so closely associated with music, for there is much 
to say for the contention that reading and applying a Constitution (and, as a matter 
of fact, any enacted law) is more like performing a piece of music than like reading a 
newspaper. Enacted laws are made and meant to have effect, and their provisions 
must accordingly be construed to be of consequence. Its effect-directedness makes 
an enacted law-text – a constitution- or a statute-in-writing – very much like sheet 
music. Its meaning and effects cannot be grasped sufficiently simply by reading it. 
Its "execution" or "performance" must also be experienced, or must at least be 
imaginable, to fully understand it. The actual effect of a constitutional provision can 
also not be gauged simply by reading and attaching meaning to signifiers that 
appear on paper, but rather from the manner in which the provision is (or could be) 
construed and applied in a real-life situation. Someone who can read music well can 
also "hear" the music when reading a score. The interpreter of enacted law-texts, 
especially someone with experience, reads those texts in a similar way. (S)he can 
imagine what a provision will "sound" like in a concrete, real-life situation. This could 
be because (s)he is seeking a solution to an actual problem or because (s)he 
hypothesises (and thus "conceives of") potentially problematic situations.110 Actual or 
potential applications of any law, including provisions of enacted law such as the 
Constitution, determine their construction decisively: there is a unity in the duality of 
what is traditionally known (and unfortunately all too often too categorically 
                                            
106 See eg Oxford University Press Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
107 Oxford University Press Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
108 WAT Date Unknown http://woordeboek.co.za. 
109 WAT Date Unknown http://woordeboek.co.za. 
110 Du Plessis 2000 SA Public Law 295. 
L DU PLESSIS  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1356 
 
distinguished) as interpretation and application. 
11 Finale (and concluding perspectives) 
"Objection!" a disillusioned (and by now wary and weary) reader of the Constitution 
may bellow, and then continue: "Enough of a Constitution with its perennial erosion 
and inevitable disempowerment of tried and tested common-law principles; with its 
enfeebling overemployment and mixing-up of assorted values; with its prolific 
production of sonorous jargon like subsidiarity, 'judicial self-restraint', trias politica, 
'reading in conformity with the Constitution' and, on native African soil, ubuntu, 
ubuntu and ubuntu."111 Must "leitmotiv" really be squeezed into an arsenal already 
replete with the law's construction equipment such as ideas, values, concepts, 
principles, rules, canons, theories and doctrine? Do we, in any event, need 
"leitmotiv" in our "lawspeak?" Our seemingly well informed, hypothetical denigrator 
is clearly sceptical (to say the least) about any possibility that working with (the 
notion of) leitmotivs can add value to the construction of enacted law.  
A preponderance of opinion has it that the idea of leitmotivs sits most comfortably 
with pen-art (that is, creative writing such as poetry, prose and drama), the plastic 
arts and the performing arts (especially music). It is unnecessary, however, to 
devote time to proving or disproving this proposition, for it is also widely accepted 
that leitmotivs do occur and indeed thrive in text genres other than those just 
mentioned, and most certainly in law-texts too, albeit sporadically and often 
unnamed as such. 
In several places in the constitutional text, a formulaic reference to "an open and 
democratic society" occurs, and in most instances it is followed by the further 
qualifier "based on human dignity, equality and freedom". The three key values just 
mentioned can also be referred to as the "triumvirate" of values. The Preamble, in 
an anticipatory vein, speaks of a democratic and open society whose foundations 
were laid with the adoption of the Constitution. In Chapter 1 of the Constitution, 
                                            
111 Metaphorically expressing itself as umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu: "a person is a person because 
of people" or "a person is a person through other persons"; see S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 
(CC) para 10. 
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entitled Founding Provisions, and especially in section 1(a), human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms are 
said to be values on which the state is founded. This is serious business, which is 
why amendments to sections 1 and 74(1) of the Constitution require an 
"extraordinarily enhanced" majority of 75 per cent, surpassing the two-thirds 
benchmark for a "standard" or "ordinarily enhanced" majority. 
Section 7(1) introduces the Bill of Rights as "a cornerstone of democracy in South 
Africa" affirming, among other values, "the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom". Section 39(1) enjoins adjudicative fora, construing legislation 
and developing common and customary law, to "promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom". Of the 
same tenor are stipulations in section 36(1) regarding the extent to which a law of 
general application may limit a constitutional right. The limitation must, among other 
things, be "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom". 
These are but some examples of the constitutional references to a free and open 
society and the triumvirate of values on which it is based. The said examples come 
from section 1 of the Constitution and from the Bill of Rights, and they closely link 
(the ideal of) an open and democratic society with the triumvirate of values, tellingly 
instantiating a leitmotiv which recurs as the keynote or defining idea, motif or 
topos112 throughout the Bill of Rights, but arguably also throughout the Constitution 
as a whole. This leitmotiv is the (ideal of an) open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. 
A leitmotiv could – in some instances more than in others - have a lot to do with 
values and principles and especially with reading and communicating (and 
"digesting") them. But a leitmotiv is not a value or a principle per se, and vice versa. 
It is, as its name indicates, a motif of a sort – also referred to as a literary device. 
Judiciously invoked, however, a leitmotiv is, in point of fact, much more than a 
                                            
 
112  Topos: a traditional or conventional literary or rhetorical theme or topic; plural topoi. 
 
L DU PLESSIS  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1358 
 
literary device. It can, for instance, be quite useful in contemplating and developing 
a reading (and listening) strategy for non-literary texts too. The examples from the 
Bill of Rights above indeed show that the notion of a "leitmotiv" can also work quite 
efficiently with law-texts, and especially with the Constitution. 
A leitmotiv is usually thought of as a phenomenon on the move, recurrently 
establishing and asserting itself, and frequently encountered in a text. But it is not all 
about movement, generated by, amongst other impulses, the recurrence of a 
prospective leitmotiv. A broad interest in the consequences of the motif's amassing 
power and attaining precedence to the point where it achieves the status of a 
leitmotiv is also up for scrutiny. The movements of a leitmotiv can then, for the time 
being, be reined in, since a host of other factors can at this point join in to add to or 
subtract from the status and weightiness of a prospective leitmotiv. Recall the 
founding provisions in section 1 of the Constitution. As explained before, they are 
entrenched more rigidly than other sections of the Constitution, requiring among 
other things an "extraordinarily enhanced" majority (75 per cent versus 66⅔ per 
cent) for their amendment. This in itself, directly and indirectly, enhances the status 
of these provisions. The full implications of this proposition stand to be determined 
from case to case and vis-a-vis – but also in interactive "partnership" with – other 
texts. Scouting out and engaging with leitmotivs call for profound reading and for 
text analysis of a sort with which "logical" jurists are not always too comfortable, but 
which at all times have the potential to be exceptionally rewarding. 
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